Trump's Middle East Gamble-Arming Today's Allies Could Create Tomorrow's Enemies

History is filled with governments that armed a friendly regime only to watch those weapons one day fall into hostile hands.

America supplied the Shah of Iran with billions of dollars in advanced military equipment. A few years later, the Islamic Revolution transformed one of Washington's closest allies into one of its most dangerous enemies.

The United States armed Afghanistan's mujahideen to fight the Soviets. Some of those networks eventually evolved into movements that would later threaten America itself.

Iraq's military, once backed by the West against Iran, eventually became an adversary. Libya's weapons spread across North Africa after Gaddafi fell. Syria's civil war demonstrated how quickly sophisticated military hardware can disappear into the hands of extremists.

The lesson is simple: governments change. Alliances shift. Weapons remain.

That is why two recent foreign policy positions by President Donald Trump deserve far more scrutiny than they are receiving.

The administration has pursued civilian nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia while also expressing support for eventually restoring Turkey's access to the F-35 stealth fighter program should legal barriers be removed.

Each proposal can be defended on short-term geopolitical grounds.

Taken together, however, they represent an enormous long-term gamble with the security of Israel, the stability of the Middle East, and ultimately America's own future.

Supporters of a civilian nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia argue that the kingdom remains a valuable American partner. They point to cooperation against Iran, intelligence sharing, economic ties, and the possibility of expanding regional peace.

Those are legitimate strategic considerations.

The problem is that nuclear technology does not disappear when today's rulers leave office.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman made his position unmistakably clear several years ago when he stated that if Iran obtained a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would seek one as well.

That statement fundamentally changes the conversation.

Civilian nuclear programs are not inherently military programs, but uranium enrichment technology can shorten the pathway to developing nuclear weapons if political leaders choose that course.

That is precisely why American non-proliferation policy has historically demanded strict safeguards.

For decades, the United States insisted that friendly nations seeking civilian nuclear cooperation accept significant restrictions on domestic enrichment and extensive international oversight.

Weakening those standards today may encourage other regional powers to demand identical treatment tomorrow.

The greatest danger is not necessarily the current Saudi leadership.

The greatest danger is whoever governs Saudi Arabia thirty years from now.

No president can guarantee the House of Saud will rule forever.

Political revolutions have transformed numerous Middle Eastern governments within a single generation.

Iran once appeared to be America's most dependable regional ally.

Few predicted that Ayatollah Khomeini would overthrow the monarchy and create the Islamic Republic that has spent decades funding terrorist organizations while threatening Israel's destruction.

Could something similar happen elsewhere?

No one knows.

But history teaches that stable-looking governments can collapse with astonishing speed.

Saudi Arabia remains home to competing ideological currents. Although its government has aggressively fought al-Qaeda and ISIS, extremist Islamist movements have repeatedly targeted the kingdom.

Should future instability ever place sensitive nuclear expertise, enrichment facilities, or nuclear materials into the hands of a radically different regime, the consequences would extend far beyond Saudi Arabia.

Technology cannot be uninvented.

The administration's openness toward eventually restoring F-35 sales to Turkey raises another strategic concern.

Congress currently prohibits transferring the aircraft because Turkey purchased Russia's S-400 missile defense system and was removed from the F-35 program in 2019.

That legal barrier remains in place.

Nevertheless, President Trump has publicly praised Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as an ally while dismissing Israeli objections to a possible future sale.

Israel's concerns are understandable.

The F-35 is not simply another fighter aircraft. It is among the world's most advanced stealth combat platforms.

Israel has long maintained its qualitative military edge as a cornerstone of American policy in the Middle East.

That advantage has helped deter larger coalitions of hostile neighbors from believing they could successfully wage war against the Jewish state.

Introducing comparable capabilities into the hands of a government whose relationship with Israel has deteriorated dramatically risks changing that balance.

Erdoğan has repeatedly condemned Israel in increasingly harsh language while maintaining close ties with Hamas and positioning Turkey as one of Israel's most vocal regional critics.

Israeli leaders have warned that providing Ankara with F-35s would weaken deterrence and complicate Israel's long-term security planning.

Those concerns deserve serious consideration.

Supporters of these policies argue that stronger partnerships keep countries aligned with Washington rather than Beijing or Moscow.

There is logic to that argument.

The United States understandably wants influential regional powers inside its strategic orbit.

But history repeatedly demonstrates that military technology often outlives diplomatic relationships.

America should ask not only who receives advanced capabilities today, but who might control them in twenty or thirty years.

That question becomes even more pressing in a region where governments have fallen, revolutions have erupted, military coups have occurred, and radical Islamist movements continue seeking greater influence.

Military planners are trained to prepare for worst-case scenarios--not merely best-case assumptions.

Foreign policy should operate the same way.

Some supporters believe these initiatives could encourage broader Arab-Israeli normalization.

Peace is unquestionably worth pursuing.

But peace built upon strategic concessions that permanently increase proliferation risks or weaken Israel's military advantage may ultimately prove far more costly.

Regional peace should stand on shared security interests, economic cooperation, and mutual recognition--not on incentives that future generations may come to regret.

President Trump has demonstrated a willingness to think differently than previous administrations, and that has produced significant foreign policy successes.

Yet even successful presidents can make strategic mistakes when immediate diplomatic gains overshadow long-term security realities.

The Middle East has repeatedly shown that today's ally can become tomorrow's adversary with astonishing speed.

Once nuclear capabilities spread, they cannot be recalled.

Once advanced weapons are transferred, they cannot simply be taken back.

History suggests that America should be extremely cautious before placing tomorrow's security in the hands of political assumptions that may not survive the next generation.