Israel Won't Let Turkey Become The New Iran In Syria

For years, Israel's greatest concern in Syria was Iran.

Iranian forces, weapons depots, missile infrastructure and supply routes to Hezbollah gradually transformed Syria into a potential forward operating base against the Jewish state. Israel responded with hundreds of airstrikes designed to prevent that military infrastructure from becoming permanently entrenched.

But Syria has changed.

Iran's influence has been dramatically weakened following the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Yet the power vacuum has not remained empty.

Turkey is moving in.

That is what makes Israel's latest strike on Syria far more significant than another bombing raid.

Early Tuesday, Israeli aircraft struck the Abu al-Duhur military airbase in northwestern Syria, hitting the runway and storage facilities eight times, according to Syrian state media. No casualties were reported. Israel later acknowledged that the purpose of the attack was to prevent Turkish forces from deploying at the base.

The message to Ankara was difficult to miss:

Israel will not allow Syria to become a Turkish military platform on its northern frontier.

Turkey has become one of the principal foreign supporters of Syria's government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Ankara has been training Syrian forces, helping rebuild government institutions and infrastructure, and providing military and diplomatic support. Turkish officials have also been involved in efforts to rehabilitate Syria's military capabilities.

That includes the Abu al-Duhur airbase.

The facility, roughly 70 kilometers from the Turkish border, has largely been out of service as a dedicated military airfield since 2013. But reports indicate Turkey had begun helping rehabilitate the facility as Ankara expands its influence inside Syria.

Israel apparently decided not to wait and see what came next.

According to the Israeli prime minister's office, Syria was on the verge of violating what Israel described as an understanding to maintain the existing security situation by permitting Turkish troops to deploy at the airfield.

Israel did not bomb a fully operational Turkish military installation.

It bombed the infrastructure before Turkey could establish one.

That reflects an increasingly important principle in Israeli security thinking: dangerous military capabilities are far easier to stop before they become operational.

October 7 demonstrated the potential price of allowing hostile forces to build military infrastructure while relying upon deterrence to contain their intentions.

Israel appears increasingly unwilling to make that gamble.

A runway can be repaired.

An airbase can be rebuilt.

But once Turkish aircraft, troops, radar systems or sophisticated air-defense systems are stationed there, striking the facility becomes dramatically more dangerous.

Turkey is not Iran.

It possesses NATO's second-largest military and remains a member of the Western alliance. A direct Israeli attack on Turkish forces could therefore produce consequences far beyond Syria.

That is precisely why Israel may believe it must establish the boundaries now.

The deeper concern is not simply Turkish soldiers.

It is control of Syrian airspace.

Turkey has reportedly been involved in efforts to rebuild Syrian air defenses, including radar infrastructure. Israeli officials fear that an expanded Turkish air-defense presence could eventually restrict Israel's ability to operate freely over Syria.

For Israel, freedom of action over Syria has been central to preventing weapons transfers, missile deployments and hostile military entrenchment.

Any foreign power capable of closing that airspace would fundamentally alter Israel's security environment.

Perhaps the most troubling detail emerged after the strike.

U.S. envoy Tom Barrack revealed that Turkey had not been warned that Israeli aircraft were approaching the area. Turkish forces observed the aircraft traveling north toward Turkish territory and could reasonably have prepared a military response.

Barrack said cooler heads prevented the situation from deteriorating further.

Washington is now working to establish a stronger deconfliction mechanism between Israel, Turkey and Syria precisely to prevent a future incident from becoming an accidental military confrontation.

That tells us how serious the emerging situation has become.

Israel and Turkey are not at war.

Neither government appears eager to begin one.

But their strategic interests inside Syria are moving increasingly close to one another.

Turkey wants influence over the emerging Syrian state and appears determined to help rebuild its military capabilities.

Israel wants a weakly militarized Syria that cannot threaten its northern border or restrict Israeli operations.

Those objectives may eventually prove impossible to reconcile.

For years, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has pursued a much more assertive Turkish role across the former Ottoman sphere.

Syria now offers Ankara an extraordinary opportunity.

Iran has retreated. Russia's influence has diminished. Assad is gone. A government friendly to Turkey controls Damascus.

From Ankara's perspective, this is a historic opening to establish Turkey as the dominant outside power shaping Syria's future.

From Jerusalem's perspective, that creates an entirely different question:

Did Israel spend years preventing Iran from turning Syria into a military front only to watch another increasingly hostile regional power occupy the vacuum?

That question will shape Israeli strategy for years to come.

For Christians who watch Biblical prophecy, Turkey's expanding regional role will inevitably attract attention.

Many interpreters of Ezekiel 38 associate several of the ancient regions named in the prophetic coalition against Israel with territory found within and surrounding modern Turkey.

Prophecy watchers should pay attention to such movements.

Turkey is extending its military influence southward.

Iran remains deeply hostile toward Israel.

Syria is being reconstructed after regime collapse.

And Israel finds itself increasingly surrounded by powerful regional actors whose relationships with the Jewish state are deteriorating.

The strategic map of the Middle East continues to rearrange itself in ways that would have seemed extraordinary only a few years ago.

Israel spent the previous decade making one principle unmistakably clear to Iran:

Syria will not become your military base against us.

This week, Turkey may have discovered that the same red line applies to Ankara.