Who Will the Peacekeepers Really Watch In Gaza? Israel Has Reason To Worry

The word peace has a comforting sound. It suggests safety, stability, and an end to bloodshed. But history teaches a harder lesson: when peace is declared without power to enforce it, violence does not disappear—it simply waits. That is the looming danger behind the proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF) outlined in President Donald Trump’s plan to end the Israel–Hamas war. What is being marketed as a peacekeeping solution for Gaza is increasingly shaping up to be something far more troubling for Israel: a monitoring force that restrains Israel’s defenses while leaving Hamas intact.

According to U.S. officials cited by Reuters on December 12, international troops could be deployed to Gaza as early as next month. Yet those same officials made clear the ISF would not fight or disarm Hamas—the very terror organization that launched the October 7, 2023 massacre, murdering more than 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals and wounding thousands more. That single admission should set off alarm bells across Israel and among anyone who understands counterterrorism realities.

In mid-November, the UN Security Council endorsed Trump’s 20-point “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict,” authorizing a temporary ISF with a sweeping mandate: overseeing borders, providing security, and demilitarizing Gaza. On paper, it sounds robust. In practice, it is already being hollowed out. If the ISF will not disarm Hamas, then demilitarization becomes a slogan rather than a mission.

This is precisely the model Hamas has been demanding—a force that observes but does not enforce. Hamas leaders have repeatedly stated they will not lay down their weapons. Senior leader Khaled Mashaal openly rejected any international force with authority over “the weapons of the resistance.” Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey—longtime Hamas enablers—have echoed this position, insisting the force should merely prevent clashes, not dismantle terror infrastructure. Translation: keep Israel in check while Hamas rearms.

We have seen this movie before, and it ended badly. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), established in 1978, was tasked with ensuring peace and disarming militant groups. Instead, it presided over one of the most catastrophic failures in modern peacekeeping. Under UNIFIL’s watch, Hezbollah expanded from a lightly armed militia into a terror army with more than 150,000 rockets aimed at Israel. Weapons were embedded in civilian homes, tunnels dug beneath villages, and military sites built near UN posts. UNIFIL did not stop it. It did not dismantle it. It reported—and failed.

As Hussain Abdul-Hussain of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies noted, UNIFIL never engaged Hezbollah in law enforcement or firefights. It searched, reported, and deferred—while Hezbollah used peacekeepers as human shields to deter Israeli action. Israel was forced to watch its northern border transform into a ticking time bomb.

Now that failed model is being dusted off and transported to Gaza.

The situation grows more troubling when examining who is likely to staff this force. Many contributing nations are expected to be Muslim-majority countries whose leaders have already stated they will not “enforce peace” against Hamas. Jordan’s King Abdullah II has flatly refused to send troops, saying peace enforcement is something “nobody will want to touch.” Turkey’s foreign minister openly argued that disarming Hamas should not be the ISF’s first task. Egypt’s foreign minister described the mission as primarily monitoring the ceasefire and borders.

This is not an accusation of religious bias—it is a recognition of political reality. Many Arab and Islamic governments fear domestic backlash if their soldiers confront Hamas. They fear protests, instability, and being branded collaborators with Israel. As a result, the safest path for them is the weakest one: monitoring, humanitarian coordination, and restraint—especially restraint on Israel.

That restraint, however, would come at a devastating cost. Hamas has already demonstrated its strategy: survive, rearm, and strike again. Qatar and Turkey are reportedly floating proposals to store Hamas’s weapons “securely” or transfer them to the Palestinian Authority—temporary solutions designed to preserve Hamas’s influence until political winds shift. Israelis are not paranoid to see this as preparation for another October 7.

Gaza does not need monitors with clipboards. It needs a force willing to confront terror, seize weapons, destroy tunnels, and end Hamas’s rule decisively. It needs strength—not symbolism. To believe a UN-authorized force will aggressively dismantle a jihadist organization that openly rejects disarmament is not optimism; it is denial.

President Trump often speaks of “peace through strength.” In Gaza, that phrase is not rhetoric—it is reality. Any force unwilling to confront Hamas will inevitably end up doing something else instead: watching Israel, restraining Israel, and judging Israel, while terror quietly regroups.

Peace is not kept by standing between a killer and his victim. It is kept by stopping the killer. Until the international community is willing to do that in Gaza, any so-called peacekeeping force risks becoming exactly what Israel fears most—not a shield against terror, but a spotlight fixed firmly on the Jewish state while its enemies reload in the shadows.

If history is our guide, Israel has every reason to be wary.