Israel Is Preparing For the Day America May No Longer Stand With It

Israel has long relied on the United States as its most important ally and weapons supplier. But Israeli leaders are now planning for a future in which American support could become less reliable—or come with conditions that limit Israel’s freedom to act.

That concern came into sharper focus this month when Yisrael Beytenu chairman Avigdor Liberman warned that the United States could recognize a Palestinian state within two years. Speaking at a counterterrorism summit at Reichman University, Liberman said he believed that would not happen while President Donald Trump remains in office. He urged Israel to use the time that is left to prevent what he called a diplomatic disaster.

Liberman claimed that officials he had spoken with at the State Department and National Security Council supported recognition of a Palestinian State. He predicted that Washington could lead a United Nations Security Council resolution and described a future Palestinian state as including Judea and Samaria, the Jordan Valley, Gaza and East Jerusalem.

Liberman’s warning reflects a fear in Israel that today’s political support could shift quickly after the next change of administration or even stall if US mid-terms weaken support for Trump.

Israel has already seen how an American ally can apply pressure during a conflict. In 2024, the Biden administration paused one shipment of bombs while it reviewed Israel’s planned operation in Rafah. President Joe Biden also warned that certain offensive weapons would not be supplied if Israel launched a major ground operation there.

The pause involved specific munitions and did not amount to a complete cutoff of U.S. military aid. Still, the episode showed Israeli leaders that access to weapons can become part of a political dispute, even between close allies.

That experience helps explain why Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has called for Israel to reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers. In December, he announced plans to invest 350 billion shekels—about $110 billion—over the next decade to develop an independent arms industry. He has acknowledged that complete self-sufficiency is unrealistic, but the goal is to produce more of the weapons and ammunition Israel needs at home.

This is not merely a response to one administration. Israel faces ongoing threats from Iran and its regional allies, while its military has been using large amounts of ammunition across multiple fronts. A stronger domestic defense industry could help Israel sustain operations when foreign shipments are delayed, restricted or caught up in political debate.

For decades, support for Israel was a central part of the American political consensus. That consensus has weakened most visibly among Democrats, where criticism of Israel and opposition to U.S. military assistance have moved from the party’s progressive edge toward the center of its congressional debate.

The shift was on display in July, when the House considered an amendment to block $3.3 billion in annual security assistance to Israel. The measure failed, but 103 Democrats voted for it. The vote marked a sharp departure from the near-unanimous support Israel once received in Congress.

The disagreement reached into the party’s leadership. House Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries opposed the amendment, calling it too broad. But Katherine Clark, the second-ranking House Democrat, backed it, arguing that the United States should not provide a blank check to a country that does not comply with American law and values. Progressive Caucus Chair Greg Casar urged members to vote for the measure, saying Americans were demanding an end to U.S. tax dollars supporting Israel’s military.

The Democratic National Committee has also faced pressure to take a harder line. In 2025, a DNC panel rejected a resolution calling for an arms embargo on Israel and recognition of Palestinian statehood. The party’s national leadership did not adopt that demand. But the fight itself showed how far the debate had moved inside the party—and how difficult it has become for Democratic leaders to keep their coalition together on Israel.

Democratic Socialists of America has taken a more explicit position. At its 2025 national convention, the organization adopted a resolution declaring DSA a “fighting anti-Zionist” organization and tying DSA endorsements to anti-Zionist commitments, including support for the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Democratic socialists are not all interchangeable, and the DSA is not the entire Democratic Party. But its candidates have gained influence in Democratic primaries, and its position helps pull the party’s debate toward ending military aid and challenging Israel’s legitimacy as a Jewish state.

The voices driving this shift are not limited to elected officials. Online commentators and activist networks have made opposition to Israel a rallying point for younger voters. That pressure can affect candidates long before it becomes official party policy.

The Democratic Party has not formally adopted a platform calling to end all support for Israel. But a growing number of its elected officials, candidates and activists are calling for arms restrictions, aid conditions or a complete cutoff. Israeli leaders have reason to pay attention—not just to what Washington does today, but to what a future Congress or administration might do.

The debate is no longer confined to the left. On the right, popular commentators including Tucker Carlson, Candace Owens and the Hodgetwins have made criticism of Israel a regular part of their programming. Their views do not represent every conservative or Republican voter. Yet polling points to a real generational divide: Pew Research found that 57 percent of Republicans under 50 held an unfavorable view of Israel in its 2026 survey, while older Republicans remained much more favorable.

Republicans overall are still more supportive of Israel than opposed to it. But Israel’s leaders cannot assume that will remain true indefinitely. A country’s security policy cannot rest on the hope that one party, one generation of voters or one president will always take the same position.

Even an administration that continues to recognize Israel as an ally could impose tighter conditions on weapons, oppose Israeli diplomatic moves or decline to defend Israel at the United Nations. The change may not come as a dramatic announcement that “America is finished with Israel.” It could arrive gradually, through delayed shipments, reduced funding, diplomatic pressure or a growing reluctance to stand with Israel in international forums.

Israel is right to think seriously about its vulnerabilities. Building up domestic arms production does not mean the alliance with America is over, and it does not mean Israel can quickly replace every U.S. weapon or technology. American military aid and cooperation remain important to Israel’s security.

But wise leaders prepare for uncertainty while working to preserve valuable alliances. If support remains strong, Israel’s own industrial capacity can strengthen its defense. If support weakens, Israel will have more options than it has today.

The broader lesson reaches beyond military strategy. Nations make alliances, build weapons and plan for danger. Israel has every reason to protect its people and prepare for changing political realities. Yet Scripture reminds us that national security is never ultimate security.

“Some trust in chariots and some in horses, but we trust in the name of the Lord our God,” Psalm 20:7 says.

That does not tell Israel—or any nation—to abandon prudent preparation. It reminds us that armies, weapons and political promises have limits. Israel may be preparing for a day when American support is less certain. Its deeper hope, like the hope of every nation, cannot rest in Washington alone.